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1 Introduction
A large amount of e¤ort and literature has been devoted to understanding the determinants
of executive compensation. The availability of data and the belief that …rms can greatly
improve their performance by setting the right incentives has induced researchers to search
for complex compensation packages in the spirit of principal-agent theory. In general,
shareholders are considered in this literature as a risk neutral coordinated principal and
managers are considered risk averse agents (Holmstrom [1979] Mirrlees [1976] [1974]). The
quantity of theoretical work devoted to the topic is extremely large, and there are numerous
articles aiming to test empirically the implications of these models (see Murphy 1999 for
an extensive survey). However, in spite of all the existing work, there is still considerable
controversy on the determinants of executive compensation and their magnitude although
what seems to be an established fact is the increase over the past twenty years in performance
pay sensitivities and in the use of stock options, that dominate compensation packages for
many executives (Hall and Liebman [1998], Murphy [1999]).
Our aim with this paper is to study the e¤ects of product market competition on the ex-
plicit compensation packages that …rms o¤er to their executives. This is a relevant question
given the increase in product market competition through di¤erent channels (from dereg-
ulation to technological change and increased trade) over the past decades and because it
provides a potential explanation to the increased reliance on performance related pay in
executive compensation packages.
Product market competition will have an e¤ect on managerial compensation through
the following channels. In the …rst place competition changes the elasticity of the pro…ts
of the …rm to increases in productivity. Therefore it changes the returns to e¤ort of the
executives of the …rm (Schmidt 1997, Raith (forthcoming)) thus following a change in the
competitive environment, …rms may decide to reoptimize their compensation packages. Sec-
ondly competition changes the risk and implicit incentives that the economic environment
provides to managers and accordingly, it may change the optimal explicit incentive package
that …rms o¤er to them (Aggarwal and Samwyck 1999, Schmidt 1997). Finally and possibly
departing from the standard principal-agent approach, changes in competition may alter
the pro…t levels of the …rm, the relative bargaining power and the incentives for managers
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to extract rents from the …rm (Bebchuck, Fried & Walker 2002).
To achieve our goal of measuring the net e¤ect of competition through these channels we
estimate individual compensation equations that take into account the theoretical structure
of the incentive contracts (in particular the existence of a risk-return trade-o¤) and the fact
that individuals may self-select into di¤erent sectors according to the degree of competition.
However, since our ultimate purpose is to isolate the causal e¤ect of competition on the
sensitivity of pay to performance, the crucial issue in the analysis will be the measure of
competition used. Even though most economists may agree on a de…nition of a perfectly
competitive market, or a monopoly, problems arise when trying to …nd a measure of the
degree of competition that is unanimously accepted. We use two alternative measures of
competition to overcome this problem.
First we use concentration ratios which is a standard measure used in the industrial or-
ganisation literature and allows for comparison with other empirical papers. However this
measure can be criticised from a theoretical point of view (under certain parametrisations
of the product market it may not be a meaningful measure of competition) and from an
econometric point of view since the degree of concentration may be correlated with an omit-
ted variable in the error term or it may be endogenous to the wage setting for managers. To
account for these criticisms we develop most of the analysis using two important deregula-
tion waves in US …nancial markets as natural experiments. These deregulation episodes are
exogenous and more uncontroversial sources of competition that a¤ect particular sectors on
particular sample years. We obtain a di¤erences in di¤erences estimator using these dereg-
ulatory episodes and check their robustness to di¤erent speci…cations. Our results show
that a higher level of product market competition increases the performance pay sensitivity
of executive compensation schemes.
The added value of our work is therefore to clarify the direct and indirect e¤ects that
competition has on the compensation packages o¤ered to executives. This is a relatively
unexplored question at an empirical level even though a number of theoretical papers have
implications regarding this interaction. The consequences in terms of understanding ex-
ecutive compensation, the recent increased reliance on stock options and the increases in
sensitivities and the wider implications on the increased variance of earnings are important
implications of the paper.
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2 Theoretical background
The closest theoretical contributions to our empirical problem are the models by Schmidt
[1997] and Raith [forthcoming]. In Schmidt [1997] the explicit contract signed by a risk
neutral principal (shareholders) and a risk averse agent (CEO, executive) is in‡uenced by
the implicit incentives given by the competitive environment of the …rm. The contract
induces the manager to exert e¤ort in cost cutting activities. Competition a¤ects the
contract through two channels. On the one hand, a higher level of competition will increase
the marginal pro…t to cost cutting activities, (for instance if the elasticity of substitution
between goods is higher) and therefore the contract will have steeper incentives to induce
the manager to exert more e¤ort as the pro…t of stealing market share from other …rms
increases. On the other hand a higher level of competition will reduce the average pro…ts of
the …rm and therefore increase the likelihood of bankruptcy. If managers are worried about
this bankruptcy they will exert more e¤ort, so there is less need for an explicit contract that
induces e¤ort and therefore one should expect a contract with ‡atter incentives. Overall,
the e¤ect of an increase in competition is ambiguous.
Raith [forthcoming] has a variation on this model that solves the ambiguity. By allowing
entry and exit, endogenous exit guarantees that the average pro…ts do not drop like in
Schmidtb4s model, so the …rst e¤ect dominates and we should expect steeper incentives
associated to more competition due to more pro…table market stealing activities. The
objective of our work is to have a clear measure of the total e¤ect of a change in competition.
A decrease in competition may increase the explicit incentives provided in executive con-
tracts to compensate for the reduction on incentives produced by a fall in the bankruptcy
risk, however this is not the only mechanism for this correlation. Bebchuk, Fried & Walker
[2002] explore the evidence in existing literature for rent extracting activities in managerial
compensation and they …nd a fair number of puzzles that cannot be explained using the
standard principal agent theory and could be consistent with rent extraction explanations.
In principle one could expect that if executives are risk averse, most of the rent extraction
activities would be done through the …xed part of the compensation. However, for ”camou-
‡age” reasons we may also observe some rent extraction in the variable part of managerial
compensation. Bertrand and Mullainathan [2000] calculate a measure of ”pay for luck”
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associated with rent extraction activities on the performance based part of the executive
compensation packages. Moreover, they …nd that this pay for luck is more intense in …rms
with bad governance.
An important point when assessing the incentives implicit in a compensation package is
to assess whether the …xed part of the pay provides incentives. In this sense the e¢ciency
wages theory claims that this part should have a discipline e¤ect. One of the various possible
reasonings for this incentive is that the fear of losing their job would discipline managers and
this discipline e¤ect will be larger the larger the …xed pay that they receive. To capture these
e¤ects we will not only measure the interaction of the slope of the compensation packages
with the competition measures but also the e¤ect of competition on the …xed component of
pay. Although we will interpret some of the results on the basis of rent extraction, some of
them can equally be reinterpreted in terms of e¢ciency wages and voluntary rent sharing
by the principal/employer. (See Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984).
The few empirical papers that relate product market competition and executive compen-
sation are all in the line of Aggarwal and Samwyck [1999a] (Kedia [1996] and Joh [1999]).
These papers introduce explicitly strategic considerations and the structure of the product
market in managerial compensation to address the relative performance evaluation puzzle
(the fact that empirical studies seem not to …nd any role for relative performance evaluation
in incentive contracts). In particular they argue that principals will commit to particular
compensation structures to soften or increase the aggressiveness of their managers in the
output market. This leads to an observed relationship between product market competi-
tion and rivals’ outcomes1 . Their empirical analysis uses Execucomp data between 1993 and
1995. They claim to …nd support for the strategic complements model2. Furthermore they
1When the actions of the agents are strategic complements (prices in the Bertrand model) the principal’s
interest is to avoid aggressive price setting and hence they will not compensate managers by their relative
performance. On the contrary, managers will be compensated by the own …rm performance and the perfor-
mance of the industry as a whole. As competition (de…ned by the elasticity of substitution between goods)
increases, the weight given to the values of other …rms in the compensation contract increases. With strate-
gic substitutes (quantities in Cournot), principals will reward managers positively on own performance and
negatively on industry performance. As competition increases,the weight given to the values of other …rms in
the compensation contract increases (becomes more negative) to induce them to behave more aggressively.
2One limitation is that they proxy the elasticity of substitution, that is the measure of product market
competition on which the theoretical analysis is based by a Her…ndahl index which is a measure of con-
centration. This is a serious limitation in interpreting the results since concentration and the elasticity of
substitution are positively correlated in standard models of competition like the Dixit Stiglitz model. A
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…nd that performance-pay sensitivity is decreasing in the degree of competition measured
by this variable. Our work explicitly contradicts this result. The main reasons for this are
the inclusion in this paper of a number of explicit control variables in the regressions and
the use of a larger sample that covers years 1992 to 2000 -this actually makes most of the
di¤erence. We also use two alternative measures of competition, one of which we argue is
a true measure of competition (a sector deregulation) that is not contingent on the type of
competition in place. As will be shown below we obtain similar results for both measures.
3 Speci…cation and identi…cation strategy
Our aim is to estimate the e¤ect of product market competition on the sensitivity of
performance related pay. For this purpose we posit a wage equation at the individual
level to estimate the …xed component (Aifjt) and the variable component of compensation
(Bfjt(Performancefjt); a function of performance). Total compensation for executive i, in
…rm f , in sector j in year t; can be written as Wifjt = Aifjt+Bfjt(Performancefjt)+uifjt:
The theoretical predictions outlined in the previous section imply that not only total pay
will depend on a number of individual and …rm characteristics, but the sensitivity pay to
performance itself will vary across …rms and sectors with di¤erent features. We explicitly
model the major determinants of these coe¢cients in our empirical analysis. These can be
written as: Aifjt = f(Competitionjt, individualifjt & …rm characteristicsfjt) and Bfjt =
g(Competitionjt, variancef): Assuming linear relationships3, then:
Wifjt = Aifjt + BfjtPerffjt + ufijt (1)
higher elasticity of substitution in standard models represents an increase in competition but leads to lower
concentration, so the best measure to test their theoretical model is not the Her…ndahl index.
3Even though the compensation package of many executives may contain complex formulae, we are
imposing linearity and implicitly estimating a simple compensation package that has a …xed element and a
variable one related to the …rmb4s own pro…t. This is obviously a simplifying assumption, but our approach
is su¢ciently ‡exible to capture most of the e¤ects that we are interested in while keeping the results
interpretable. Moreover it seems that the non-discretionary component of executive compensation, usually
follows simple formulas. And there are theoretical results on the linearity of incentives (Holmstrom and
Milgrom [1987]).
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Aifjt = a0 + a1Competitionjt +a2 varf +
X
azControlsifjt
Bfjt = b0 + b1Competitionjt + b2 varf
where the slope component depends itself on sector and …rm characteristics. Given
the compensation structure assumed, the estimation of the compensation equation should
include terms where the performance measures interact with competition, rents and other
variables. The speci…cation we will estimate is:
Wifjt = a0 + a1Competitionjt + a2 varf +
X
azControlsifjt (2)
+b0Perffjt + b1CompetitionjtPerffjt + b2varjPerffjt + ufijt
uifjt = ´i + ±j +dt + ²it (3)
WherePerffjt is performance, varf is the variance of the performance measure, Competitionjt
is the relevant competition measure, dt are time dummies, ´i and ±j are individual and sector
permanent unobserved components and ²it is a white noise.
The speci…cations are …xed e¤ects regression of the levels of di¤erent compensation
measures on levels of performance measures (we later use the logarithm of compensation
as dependent variable as a robustness check). It therefore estimates the sensitivity of pay
to performance (Murphy [1999]). The main coe¢cient of interest is b1 , i.e. how the
performance pay sensitivity B changes with the level of competition in the sector. This
captures the net e¤ect of competition from the di¤erent channels outlined in the previous
section.
The estimation must account for other sources of variation of the performance pay sen-
sitivity that might be correlated with the level of competition and hence bias the coe¢cient.
We explicitly introduce the variance of performance, since in the standard principal agent
model the limiting factor to a very steep incentive contract is the risk aversion of the agent
and the fact that the returns of the …rm depend not only on her e¤ort, but also on other
random factors (therefore one expects b3 to be negative4). In fact omitting the variance term
4This e¤ect may however be less clear when we introduce measures of granted options in our compensation
package, as the valuation of these options depends positively on the volatility of the underlying shares
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biases the estimate of the performance sensitivity towards zero. We also account explicitly
for the size of the …rm (to isolate the …rm size e¤ect).
The level of variation of competition is at a sector level, and we identify b1 by comparing
two individuals working in …rms with the same level of performance in sectors with di¤erent
levels of competition. Now one must take into account any other biases arising from the
correlation between any permanent unobserved component of the wage equation and the
included regressors.
First of all we account for permanent unobserved di¤erences between sectors. If the
sector …xed e¤ects ±j are correlated with CompetitionjtPerffjt for instance because highly
competitive sectors pay higher wages regardless of the level of performance, this will bias
the results. Given that our interest variable (i.e. competition) is a sector characteristic, our
main speci…cation will include sector …xed e¤ects ±j: If the above speci…cation is correct,
then provided Cov((CompetitionjtPerffjt); ´i) = 0 the coe¢cient of interest will be unbi-
ased. However there are reasons to expect that is not true, in particular if managers select
themselves towards sectors with lower levels of competition that have higher rents and pay
higher wages. In that case b1 will underestimate the e¤ect of competition on performance
pay sensitivities (so this bias goes in our favour). In the sample, 2.4% of the individuals
actually change …rms at least once, and only one third of these are within sector changes.
Note that given that we are dealing with the market for executives in the top 1500 …rms
in the US, there are strong reasons to believe that the labour market for executives is not
restricted to the sector, but that there is considerable ‡exibility for managers to migrate
between sectors5.
The second strategy used is therefore to control additionally for individual …xed e¤ects.
The cost of this strategy is that there may not be enough individual variation to capture
the e¤ects and that the loss in e¢ciency from including individual …xed e¤ects is large. The
average number of observations per executive is just 3.8 and individual …xed e¤ects implicitly
mean losing one degree of freedom per individual. The advantage though is that movers
from one sector to another provide useful variation to identify the e¤ect of competition since
5Furthermore in the section that uses concentration ratios sectors are de…ned at 5 digit NAICS level,
which is a quite narrow de…nition of sector, so sector changes are frequent and if these changes are correlated
with ´i this will bias the results.
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our measure of concentration only varies by sector (the experiments will have time series
variation) and hence they allow us to compare the same individual in sectors with di¤erent
levels of competition6. Furthermore, it is still possible that individuals self select towards
particular …rms within their sector according to their skills in a systematic way. Individual
…xed e¤ects deal with these issues.
The above comments concerned the model speci…cation. However, the most important
aspect of the analysis probably concerns the measure of product market competition used.
We pursue two di¤erent strategies. The …rst is to use concentration ratios for the four largest
…rms in the sector at NAICS 5 digit level obtained from the US census of manufacturers
for 1997. The variation in concentration is purely cross-sectional and we use this measure
to start with because it is a standard measure of competition used in previous studies.
However, the use of concentration ratios may be subject to a number of criticisms. First,
under some parametrisations of competition, concentration is a very imperfect measure of
the competitiveness of the sector. Furthermore there are measurement issues on how these
ratios should be measured. Second, concentration may be a response to the way in which
compensation is set in the sector and hence be endogenous, or it may be correlated with
some omitted variable.
To address these issues we use an alternative measure of changes in competition that
exploits the two deregulation Acts that were passed in the US in the nineties to deregulate
the …nancial services. These are explained in the next section.
3.1 Two quasi-natural experiments: Financial deregulation in the 90’s
The decade of the 1990s is thought of as the major deregulation period for the …nancial
sector in the United States. Two major acts were implemented that were designed to foster
competition in the …nancial sector.
The …rst one was the 1994 Riegle-Neal interstate banking and Branching E¢ciency Act
that repealed two previous amendments that curtailed interstate banking. It implied that
banks were allowed to own and operate branches in di¤erent states thus generating an
increase in product market competition. Prior to that there where restrictions for banks
6The results go through when we look at stayers only. Some results for stayers are shown later on on the
robustness checks section.
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to operate across borders (although there were limited agreements between some states).
While the empirical literature on the impact of these reforms is still limited, there seems
to be a consensus between practitioners and academics on the increase of competition that
it generated and the pressure on ine¢cient banks that held local monopolies before. e.g.
”The lobbying force behind banking restrictions is widely known to be the preservation of
local monopolies or oligopolies for community banks” (Kane [1996] commenting on Golenbe
[1994] (in italics)). In addition, studies on similar reforms (the bilateral state agreements)
for earlier periods seem to …nd a considerable impact on the sector7 . The fact that this is the
most wide-ranging reform of the kind for the US since it a¤ects the whole country indicates
that the impact of the deregulation was very large. This is the …rst natural experiment used
for the 1994 turning period. We compare the years before 1994 (period 1992 and 1994) to
those after 1994 (1995 to 1996).The treatment sector is the banking sector (SIC code at two
digits is 60).
The second major reform to the …nancial industry regulation was brought about in
1999 with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act also known as the …nancial services modernisation
act. This repealed previous legislation (dating from the great Depression in the 1930s)
that imposed barriers separating traditional banking, insurance and securities underwriting
into three distinct industries which in practice meant that banks and investment …rms
were not competing with each other. The e¤ect on the …nancial services industry was
considered as rather dramatic: ”Since congress passed [...] the Gramm-Leach-Bliley act
the …nancial services industry has undergone a dramatic change as it explores developing
the best mix of products and services that can be o¤ered to customers.[...] investors,
institutions and companies are quickly bene…ting form enhanced organizational agility and
greater competition in the industry. Allan E. Sorcher (Vice-President of the Securities
Industry Association).
Thus our second test period are the years between 1997 and 1999 versus year 2000. The
treatment group here is made by …rms in sectors with SIC codes 60 to 64 and 67. They
constitute natural experiments that a¤ect only particular industries after a given year and
7Nichols and Hendrickson show the impact of previous deregulation waves from 1929 to 1989 using
Canadian banks as a benchmark for US reforms and viceversa. The freedom to establish new branches
seems to have contributed to higher levels of e¢ciency.
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therefore can be used to identify the e¤ects of competition.
Exploiting this variation we implement a di¤erences in di¤erences estimation of the
e¤ect of the increase in competition in the US …nancial sector following the two legislation
pieces. These deregulations constitute our preferred speci…cation (relative to the one using
concentration ratios) because they exploit a clear measure of an increase in competition.
The estimated compensation equation now is:
Wifjt = a0 +a1DEREGjt +a2 varf +
X
azControlsifjt (4)
+b0Perffjt + b1DEREGjtPerffjt + b2varjPerffjt + ufijt
uifjt = ´i + ±j + t±j + dt + ²it (5)
The deregulation indicator DEREGjt takes value one for the treated sectors (banking
in the 1994 deregulation or …nancial services in the 1999) in the treatment period (post
1994 and post 1999 respectively). As before, results will be presented with sector and both
sector ±j and individual ´i …xed e¤ects. Now, given the e¤ect of the deregulations arises over
time, it is important to ensure that we are not just capturing the fact that di¤erent sectors
have di¤erent trends in performance pay. To control for this possibility, sector speci…c time
trends are introduced t±j . This will capture any di¤ering time trends by sector.
In addition to the basic speci…cations with the natural experiments we do a number of
robustness checks.
The …rst robustness check is to run the analysis only on the services industry (SIC codes
60 to 81). This is a much closer comparison group than the one used before, and one would
expect that the performance pay sensitivities evolve similarly. By taking the rest of services
as a benchmark we are possibly able to more closely identify the e¤ect of the deregulation
(although the inclusion of a sector trend accounted to a large extend for these potential
between sector di¤erences).
The second check is to use the logarithm of total compensation instead of its level as a
dependent variable.
The third check is to introduce explicitly a measure of rents in the regression. The
reason for this is that in addition to these pure competition e¤ects we also expect that
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rent extraction activities may a¤ect the compensation package o¤ered to executives. In
principle higher rents should increase the …xed component of the compensation and leave
the variable part una¤ected. That is the way in which risk averse managers can obtain the
highest utility for a given amount of rent extraction. However, if they intend to camou‡age
this rent extraction as a provision of incentives they may decide to extract rents also in the
variable part of the compensation package. This e¤ect goes in the same direction as the one
predicted by the implicit incentives of the risk of the …rm going bankrupt, i.e. it would tend
to reduce the sensitivity of pay to performance as competition increases (rents fall). As
will be seen below, the results indicate that the sensitivity increases with competition, so if
anything omitting rents would increase that coe¢cient. In addition to this, the risk of using
the rents measure is that it may be endogenous if we think that the level of managerial pay
a¤ects rents. The support for this is rather limited (managerial pay is a tiny fraction of
rents). As we will see measure of rents used has an almost negligible e¤ect on the coe¢cient
of interest indicating that it is to a large extent orthogonal to our problem and hence leaving
it out does not have any major implications. Finally, the results are presented on stayers
exclusively.
4 Data description
To develop the analysis outlined above we use the Standard&Poor’s Execucomp dataset.
This is a panel dataset that covers up to the top 5 executives (ranked by salary and bonus)
of the top …rms in the US economy (it includes all of the S&P 1500, and a few other large
…rms). We use yearly data from 1992 to 2000. It records exhaustive data on executiveb4s
compensation schemes as well as some individual characteristics8 . The individual level
data on compensation includes yearly wage, bonus, stock options and other compensation.
The data also contain information on …rm characteristics and performance that will be
used in the analysis such as total assets, sales, earnings before interest and taxes (our
accounting pro…ts measure), total market return (dividend plus appreciation) of holding all
stock during the year. The full sample contains around 95000 observations that correspond
8There is also a limited amount of individual characteristics. We will use gender. Age and tenure are
only a vailable for a very limited number of observations, and the criteria of selection are not clear, so we
decided not to include these.
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to 22000 individuals.
To construct the competition variables we obtained concentration ratios from the 1997
US Economic Census (published by US Census) at di¤erent levels (the share of production
of the top four, eight, twenty and …fty …rms in a given sector). These measures are computed
at the NAICS 5 digit level and we use the top four concentration ratio throughout since
at this high level of disaggregation it is the magnitude with more variation. The top four
concentration ratio is the proportion of total sector revenue accounted for by the largest
four …rms in the sector. The average concentration ratio in the sample is 30%.
We also use an alternative competition measure that comes from 2 deregulation episodes
in the banking and …nancial sectors. The Riegle-Neal interstate banking and Branching Ef-
…ciency Act, published in 1994 increased interstate competition between commercial banks,
and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act also known as the …nancial services modernisation act
meant a drastic liberalisation of …nancial services in 1999. Both of them a¤ect particular
sectors in particular periods of time, so we can use them as natural experiments following a
di¤erences in di¤erences procedure. To avoid the interference between both natural experi-
ments we use the period 1993-1994 as the control sample for the …rst experiment (banking
sector) and 1995-1996 as the treatment period. For the second experiment (…nancial services
sector) we will use 1997-1999 as control sample and 1999-2000 as treatment period.
With these data a number of econometric speci…cations were evaluated and the results
are described below. The aim is to evaluate the e¤ect of competition on variations in the
variable component of the compensation scheme. For this purpose we use as dependent
variables three di¤erent magnitudes that capture this variable component. First we used
total executive compensation earned by the executive in a given year including the pro…t
from exercising stock options in that year (and excluding options granted). Second, we
use salary plus bonus (to abstract form the impact of stock options). Finally we used the
Black-Sholes value of options granted9.
9A comment is in order on the use of stock options granted as a dependent variable. Stock options
are an increasingly important component of executive compensation. However, given their magnitude and
volatility, it is problematic to analyse them jointly with other compensation items. It is important when
dealing with stock options to value them adequately, especially given that granting stock options is at the
same time a reward for performance and an incentive device in itself.
There are two main ways to deal with options in this environment. One possibility is to consider the value
of the options granted as a sum of money given to the executive. This possibility is particularly attractive
12
We then evaluate the e¤ect of accounting and market returns separately on these com-
pensation measures. All variables are at constant 1996 prices. Even though corporate
…nance would predict that market returns are the relevant magnitude in this respect, pre-
vious research points to the fact that accounting pro…ts are also relevant (Bushman and
Smith 2001).
Accounting returns are measured as earnings before interest and taxes and market re-
turns are total market returns (dividend plus appreciation) of holding the stock during the
year.
Since risk must be accounted for when estimating compensation sensitivities the variance
of the return is computed over the sample period. The relevant risk measure is the variance
of performance since that is the risk faced by the variable component of pay10. We compute
a variable that is the sample cumulative density of the variance of the returns of the …rm.
This is a measure of the relative position of the …rm variance with respect to the variance
of returns of other …rms that smooths the measure of the variance such that it contains no
outliers. This is our risk measure throughout the paper.
The robustness checks include a measure of the rents available to the …rm to account
for the feasibility of rent extraction. Given the available data this is de…ned as a markup
measure computed as pro…ts before interest, taxes and extraordinary items over sales11.
The size of the …rm is also controlled for by the logarithm of assets.
if executives already hold a portfolio of the …rmb4s shares and can rebalance it to keep an optimal exposure
to the …rmb4s risk or if they can trade on derivatives to achieve the same goal. However if such portfolio
cannot ”absorb” the amount of stock options granted and there is not a liquid market for such options this
approach does not take into account that the number of options granted, not only has some intrinsic value
but also this value is sensitive to the …rmb4s performance. In this latter case it is also true that using the
Black-Scholes formula to value these options may overstate their value, as it is not taking into account the
illiquidity of these options and the limited diversi…cation strategies available (Hall and Murphy [2000]).
Another possibility would be to calculate the aggregate sensitivity of the value of all granted options
to …rm performance (overall delta) and consider them as an incentive contract. This strategy has two
limitations: a practical limitation, as with the available data it is hard to measure this aggregate sensitivity
and a limitation related to the extent to which executives can ”undo” this incentive contract by rebalancing
their portfolios. Throughout this paper we take a pragmatic approach, showing regressions explaining total
compensation (including options executed) and options granted (at B&S value).
10In principle managers could have a well diversi…ed port-folio in which case the relevant measure of risk
would be the covariance of performance with the stock market divided by the varaince of market returns
(the betas). In practice manager’s human capital and assets are heavily invested in the …rm and the variance
of risk is a more relevant risk measure.
11Because of data limitations we cannot deduce the true cost of capital.
13
We also include as explanatory variables gender and whether the individual is the com-
panyb4s CEO. All regressions include year dummies to account for the cyclicality of com-
pensation.
A main concern in the analysis was that many of the dependent and independent vari-
ables used typically have very large outliers. This is problematic when running ordinary
least squares-type regressions. To deal with this issue we restricted somewhat the sample
and dropped the top outliers12 of options granted and total compensation. The results are
not sensitive to the exact cut-o¤ point chosen. It is only the inclusion of very large option
grants or total compensation that alters the results. Previous analysis using median re-
gressions to minimise the impact of outliers was consistent with these results. However the
impossibility to account for individual …xed e¤ects in those regressions (and the relevance
of accounting for unobserved heterogeneity that is con…rmed by the results) is what lead us
to have least squares regressions without outliers as our preferred speci…cation.
5 Results
In this section we present the results obtained for the determinants of managerial compen-
sation, in particular of total compensation (including options executed) and stock options
granted. We estimate equation (1) and present the sensitivity analysis and robustness checks
progressively.
5.1 Analysis using concentration ratios
The results in this section use as competition measure concentration ratios by sector. These
are at highly disaggregated sector levels for 1997.
Tables 2 to 4 present results using accounting returns as the measure of performance for
the equation on Total Compensation, Salary plus bonus and Options granted respectively.
12The sample was restricted by excluding from the analysis executives with very large outliers of either
total compensation or options granted. The 99% cuto¤ point for total compensation the sample was 14887,
but the maximum value was 655717 (respectively 11001 and 557529 for granted options) -the minimum in
either case being zero. The enormous weight of these variables in a least squares framework led us to drop
variables with total compensation greater than 30000 and options granted greater than 24000 (these values
were chosen at above the 99% cuto¤ point to include roughly 0.3% of the sample). In total this amounts to
528 observations, i.e, 0.6% of the total sample.
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Tables 5 and 7 use market returns as measure of performance. Columns 1 and 2 contain
sector …xed e¤ects only. Column 3 contains individual …xed e¤ects in addition to the sector
dummies.
As is well known in this setting it is crucial to control for the fact that the level of
compensation will depend on the risk associated to the contract, to the performance of
the company. Hence we introduce the variance of the relevant performance measure in the
regressions in column 2 of all tables. When this is interacted with the performance measure
in levels we …nd that the sensitivity of pay to performance is decreasing in the variance of
the …rm: Again, this is true for accounting pro…ts and market returns.
To summarise the results, the performance pay sensitivity is increasing in the perfor-
mance measure and levels o¤ after some point (has a very smooth hump shape). Concerning
the e¤ect of product market competition on incentives provided we …nd that the estimated
coe¢cient bb1 on the interaction between concentration and returns is negative and signif-
icant in most speci…cations. This indicates that more competitive sectors provide steeper
incentives to their managers and hence that the incentive provision e¤ect dominates the
market discipline e¤ect in net terms. Let’s see now in more detail the results obtained.
On the e¤ect of competition on the sensitivity of total compensation to accounting pro…ts
(table 2) the …rst thing to note is that the estimate changes substantially from the sector
e¤ects to the individual …xed e¤ects model (indicating selection on unobservables for that
magnitude), actually more than doubling the estimated sensitivity. This suggests a negative
correlation between the individual …xed e¤ect and accounting returns (the same qualitative
results apply to the salary plus bonus speci…cation). In the …xed e¤ects speci…cation an
increase in a million dollars in accounting returns increases total compensation by 5702
dollars. The e¤ect of competition on this sensitivity is to increase it by 5% if one goes from
a concentration ratio of one -where the four largest …rms dominate the whole market- to
a highly competitive sector (with close to zero CR4). The increase in sensitivity of salary
plus bonus due to competition is around 2% and that of stock options is 11%13.
Concerning the sensitivity of total compensation to market returns with minimal con-
centration, it around 1300 dollars for every extra million dollars in market returns. This is
13All e¤ects in what follows are computed at the median where the e¤ect of the variance term of the
performance measure is negligible with respect to the coe¢cient on performance in levels.
15
reduced by 3% if we consider a monopoly in the sector …xed e¤ects speci…cation (column
2). The average market return is around 700 million dollars, that gives a variable pay at
mean market return of 910 thousand dollars per annum. In a monopolistic sector this is
reduced by 27300 dollars. In the individual …xed e¤ects regression the sensitivity of pay to
performance is very similar (indicating no selection on unobservables with respect to market
returns). However signi…cance is lost for the e¤ect of product market competition.
The e¤ect of competition on stock options granted is substantial. In all tables we …nd
that only when we introduce individual …xed e¤ects the e¤ect of product market competition
becomes signi…cant suggesting a negative correlation between the competition/performance
interaction and the …xed e¤ect. In the individual …xed e¤ects speci…cation concentration
reduces the sensitivity by 11% in the accounting and 20% in the market returns cases.
The size of the …rm (measured by the log of assets) a¤ects positively both total compen-
sation and options granted. It is interesting to note that the estimate of that e¤ect changes
substantially (it double or triples) when we allow for individual …xed e¤ects. This suggests
a negative correlation between the individual …xed e¤ect and the size of the …rm.
Finally we controlled for gender and whether the individual was the CEO of the com-
pany. Men represent 96% of the sample and they earn signi…cantly more than women
(around 250 thousand dollars more on average). CEOs also earn more than non-CEOs by
whichever measure we measure compensation. In the individual …xed e¤ects speci…cation
(that estimates the impact of being a CEO exclusively through changers of CEO status)
the e¤ect is around 200 thousand dollars total compensation and 350 thousand dollars more
options granted for CEOs.
5.2 A natural experiment: Deregulation in the 90’s
The previous section showed that competition measured by concentration ratios tends to
increase the steepness of pay-performance contracts o¤ered to executives. An extensive set
of controls and …xed e¤ects regressions were used to control for as many observable and
unobservable factors as possible. However, as was mentioned before, concentration ratios
may be objected to on the grounds that they are an imperfect measure of competition or
that they may be correlated with some omitted variable leading to omitted variable bias.
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This section uses two quasi- natural experiments to address these problems and con…rm the
results.
Given that these deregulation processes only a¤ected particular industries in given pe-
riods, the identi…cation strategy is based on a di¤erences in di¤erences estimation. Control
variables identical to the ones used in the previous section are included in the regressions.
To avoid spurious results that could be driven by the fact that di¤erent sectors are subject
to di¤erent trends independently from the experiment we also include sector speci…c time
trends for all sectors.
The results can be seen in tables 8 to 12. Estimates are shown for total compensation
(columns 1 and 4), salary plus bonus (columns 2 and 5) and options granted (columns 3
and 6). Columns 4 to 6 include individual …xed e¤ects. The variables FIN and FIN94 take
value 1 in the treatment periods for the sectors that experienced deregulation and 0 for the
control sample and the pre-treatment period. FIN94 corresponds to the e¤ect of the Riegle-
Neal interstate banking and Branching E¢ciency Act between 1994 and 1997 and FIN
corresponds to the e¤ect of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act from 1999 to 2000. These same
variables also interact with the performance levels of …rms to see the e¤ect of deregulation
on the pay-performance slope.
In all speci…cations we …nd that after the deregulation, the slope of performance related
pay becomes steeper. The coe¢cient is both quantitatively important and statistically
signi…cant. The positive sign shows how the pay-performance sensitivity increased after
deregulation happened, thus con…rming our results of section (5.1). Whether we look at
total compensation, salary plus bonus or options granted, and whether we use accounting
pro…ts or market returns as our performance measure the result seems to be con…rmed.
This is true including individual …xed e¤ects and a sector speci…c trend in the regressions
(only the speci…cation for options granted loses signi…cance when we introduce individual
…xed e¤ects). Quantitatively the e¤ect is also very large, for example, table 8 shows that the
market pay performance sensitivity is 31% higher in the treated (banking) sector after the
deregulation than before. Table 9 shows that the pay performance sensitivity to accounting
returns increases by 12% post deregulation.
Similar results are shown in tables 9 and 11 for the 1999 deregulation of …nancial ser-
vices. The sensitivity of total compensation to market returns is increased by 15% in the
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…nancial services sectors after deregulation. That of salary and bonus increased by 11% and
that of options granted by 42%. For accounting pro…ts the e¤ects are 9%, 13% and 13%
respectively. Higher levels of competition are therefore here again associated with steeper
incentive schemes.
Note also that in most speci…cations there is a negative and signi…cant e¤ect of the
deregulation on the level (i.e. non performance based) part of the compensation package.
This may be due to the fact that the deregulation lowered pro…ts and reduced the possibility
of rent extraction. It therefore provides indirect supporting evidence that the experiments
are actually capturing an increase in product market competition since this is the e¤ect one
would expect.
Robustness checks of these basic speci…cations are presented on tables 10 and 13. These
are for total compensation as dependent variable and market returns as performance mea-
sure (so it should be compared to column 4 of the corresponding deregulation table with
market returns as performance measure). The …rst column of tables 10 and 13 restricts the
analysis to the services industries (including …nancial and other services instead of taking
as benchmark all other sectors of the economy). By taking sectors that are closer to the
deregulated industries the benchmark is stricter (although the inclusion of a sector trend
deals with this in a parametric way). The results are almost unchanged with respect to the
previous analysis (only the sensitivity to market returns is somewhat reduced).
The second column takes the logarithm of the dependent variable and results are qual-
itatively unchanged.
The third column introduces a measure of rents (computed as net income over sales).
As we mentioned before the fact that pro…ts may fall as competition increases implies
that performance pay sensitivities may be reduced (because of reduced return to e¤ort
form the fall in pro…ts or because reduced rent extraction). To address to what extent
this mechanism plays a role we introduce explicitly a measure of rents in column 3. Our
coe¢cient of interest is again robust to introducing rents which indicates that omitting this
variable does not a¤ect the results.
Finally, the fourth column restricts the analysis to stayers. This restricts the identi…ca-
tion of the e¤ect to workers who were in the deregulated industries prior to deregulation and
that underwent it. In the speci…cation with movers, the e¤ect was also identi…ed through
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workers who moved into the deregulated sectors after deregulation. If these changes are
correlated with some unobserved characteristic, the coe¢cient will not be capturing the
causal e¤ect of competition on performance pay sensitivities. Again, the results on the
variable of interest are unchanged.
The results are robust to all these checks and the overall evidence from these experiments
indicates that the increase in competition reduced the …xed component of pay and increased
the sensitivity of the variable component.
6 Conclusions
The determinants of managerial compensation have received a lot of attention and faced
heated debate but little is known about how these are a¤ected by the degree of product mar-
ket competition that …rms face. The competitive environment generates implicit incentives
that determine the design of compensation packages and hence alter the need for and mag-
nitude of explicit incentives. In this paper we draw together the main theories explaining
managerial compensation and the impact of product market competition on compensation
packages and evaluate empirically its e¤ect.
Our results show that the net e¤ect of product market competition is to increase the
performance pay sensitivity, indicating that as competition increases managers will be faced
with steeper explicit incentives. This is true after controlling for the implicit risk in the
economic environment faced by the manager. The results are also robust to di¤erent mea-
sures of product market competition. In particular, we use two deregulation experiences as
a natural experiment in which a dramatic increase of the competition levels happened for
a subsample of …rms. The results using this measure are highly signi…cant and robust to
a number of di¤erent speci…cations. Furthermore they do not di¤er qualitatively from the
ones using a standard concentration ratio index.
The results therefore indicate that increased product market competition leads to a
higher reliance on performance related pay. Thus it provides a potential explanation for
the trend over the past decades of an increased used of these compensation mechanisms. It
also indicates that the dispersion of earnings in the economy is likely to increase as product
markets become more competitive and hence this can be an additional explanation for the
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recent increase in earnings inequality. Direct tests of these issues are left for future research.
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7 Tables
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Median Minimum Maximum
Salary 95545 305.17 207.77 250 0 4065.1
Bonus 95545 237.26 500.29 108 0 14276
Total comp. 95545 1158.02 2173.68 512.0 0 29988.38
Salary+bonus 95545 542.44 620.96 370.8 0 15251
Options granted 80766 640.26 1679.23 139.7 0 23991.26
Conc. ratio top4 86131 0.30 0.15 0.28 0.007 0.89
CR4*mkt. ret. 73420 24818.8 217942.3 1689.6 -5995770 7680000
CR4*acc.prof 85765 102.54 421.84 16.6 -3180.04 11643.2
Acc. pro…ts (million US dollars) 95170 293.40 978.92 65.5 -9026 27493
Acc. pro…ts sqd. (million US dollars) 95170 995935.1 1.05e+07 6193.6 3.95e-06 6.52e+08
Market returns (10; 000s US dollars) 81540 70479.8 548955 7110.3 -1.09e+07 2.08e+07
Market returns sqd (10; 000s US doll.) 81540 3.06e+11 5.53e+12 5.13e+08 0 4.31e+14
Var. (cdf) pro…ts 95514 0.51 0.28 0.5 0 1
Var. (cdf) mkt.ret. 93336 0.50 0.28 0.5 0 1
Rents 95067 -.09 6.11 0.054 -670.36 232.7
ln assets 95247 7.08 1.77 6.9 -3.07 13.26
CEO 95549 0.13 0.34 0 0 1
male 95549 0.96 0.18 1 0 1
Var.acc.prof*acc.prof 95144 249.40 962.87 25.03 -9026 27448.03
Var. mkt.ret.*mkt.ret. 81025 65017.7 542141.3 1622.6 -1.09e+07 2.07e+07
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Table 2: E¤ect of acc. pro…ts and concentration on total compensation
(1) (2) (3)
Total Comp. Total Comp. Total Comp.
Acc. pro…ts 0.5704*** 2.0769*** 5.7121***
(29.20) (13.97) (21.73)
Acc. pro…ts squd. -2.4e-6* 2.0e-6 2.5e-6*
(1.91) (1.52) (1.69)
CR4*acc. prof. -0.3642*** -0.3213*** -0.2895***
(8.76) (7.74) (4.06)
ln assets 342.2036*** 197.8142*** 533.5037***
(59.28) (22.16) (29.68)
ceo 1,339.37*** 1,344.08*** 216.89***
(68.81) (69.21) (7.03)
Male 238.3880*** 242.1911***
(6.67) (6.79)
Variance prof. 871.35*** -200.84
(20.49) (1.03)
Var. prof*acc. -1.56*** -5.14***
(10.27) (19.04)
Constant -1,983*** -1,421*** -2,465
(33.91) (22.18) (1.10)
Time dummies yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes yes
Individual e¤ects no no yes
Observations 85765 85739 85739
Number of sect. 333 333
R-squared 0.18 0.18 0.13
Number of indiv. 19138
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* signi…cant at 10%; ** signi…cant at 5%; *** signi…cant at 1%..
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Table 3: E¤ect of acc. pro…ts and concentration on salary plus bonus
(1) (2) (3)
Sal+bonus Sal+bonus Sal+bonus
Acc. pro…ts 0.2024*** 0.7432*** 1.7342***
(42.48) (20.49) (36.99)
Acc. pro…ts squd. -4.7e-6*** -3.2e-6*** -1.6e-6***
(14.98) (9.93) (6.16)
CR4*acc. prof. -0.1285*** -0.1162*** -0.0305**
(12.68) (11.47) (2.40)
ln assets 124.9530*** 92.7460*** 11.6399***
(88.76) (42.60) (3.63)
ceo 579.2479*** 579.9217*** 220.8892***
(122.03) (122.43) (40.14)
Male 82.6519*** 82.9749***
(9.48) (9.53)
Variance prof. 181.8449*** 397.8593***
(17.54) (11.42)
Var. prof*acc. prof -0.5607*** -1.6029***
(15.08) (33.24)
Constant -629.0431*** -502.2700*** 333.9345
(44.11) (32.13) (0.84)
Observations 85765 85739 85739
Time dummies yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes yes
Indiv. e¤ects no no yes
Number of sectors 333 333 333
R-squared 0.32 0.32 0.24
Number of indiv. 19138
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* signi…cant at 10%; ** signi…cant at 5%; *** signi…cant at 1%..
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Table 4: E¤ect of acc. pro…ts and concentration on options granted
(1) (2) (3)
Options grant. Options grant. Options grant.
Acc. pro…ts 0.1071*** -0.2642** 1.2875***
(6.15) (2.07) (5.40)
Acc. pro…ts squd. 7.3e-6*** 6.9e-6*** 4.4e-6***
(6.54) (5.97) (3.24)
CR4*acc. prof. -0.0648* -0.0548 -0.1478**
(1.79) (1.52) (2.34)
ln assets 242.9377*** 142.3704*** 355.9343***
(46.69) (17.65) (20.87)
ceo 758.9020*** 760.9737*** 347.0298***
(47.57) (47.84) (13.24)
Male 70.2694** 75.6455**
(2.13) (2.30)
Variance prof. 672.2337*** -421.3920**
(17.87) (2.44)
Var. prof*acc. prof 0.3814*** -1.0211***
(2.91) (4.13)
Constant -1,612.96*** -1,214.43*** -1,721.26
(29.85) (20.48) (0.70)
Time dummies yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes yes
Individual e¤ects no no yes
Observations 72482 72456 72456
Number of sectors 333 333 333
R-squared 0.11 0.12 0.08
Number of indiv. 19104
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* signi…cant at 10%; ** signi…cant at 5%; *** signi…cant at 1%
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Table 5: E¤ect of market returns and concentration on total compensation
(1) (2) (3)
Total Comp. Total Comp. Total Comp.
Market return 0.0006*** 0.0136*** 0.0132***
(14.54) (34.10) (32.54)
Market ret. squd. 3.5e-12* 1.8e-11*** 2.2e-11***
(1.92) (10.03) (11.15)
CR4*market ret. -0.0006*** -0.0003*** -0.0000
(6.47) (3.02) (0.00)
ln assets 477.7028*** 317.5006*** 675.3671***
(79.47) (36.18) (28.43)
ceo 1,346.8148*** 1,355.2711*** 191.3208***
(64.64) (65.85) (5.03)
Male 246.7655*** 253.1776***
(6.20) (6.44)
Variance*market ret. -0.0134*** -0.0132***
(32.78) (31.78)
Variance market 1,000.7254*** -40.4610
(22.25) (0.17)
Constant -3,066.92*** -2,457.03*** -3,498.35
(49.24) (37.06) (1.26)
Time dummies yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes yes
Individual e¤ects no no yes
Observations 73370 72904 72904
Number of sectors 331 327
R-squared 0.17 0.19 0.12
Number of individuals . 18422
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
signi…cant at 10%; ** signi…cant at 5%; *** signi…cant at 1%
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Table 6: E¤ect of market returns and concentration on salary plus bonus
(1) (2) (3)
Salary+bonus Salary+bonus Salary+bonus
Market return 0.0001*** 0.0024*** 0.0023***
(12.57) (24.69) (31.52)
Market ret. squd. -1.3e-12*** 1.2e-12*** 3.0e-12***
(2.87) (2.65) (8.29)
CR4*market ret. -0.0001*** -0.00005** -0.000008
(4.55) (2.10) (0.43)
ln assets 173.0780*** 159.0564*** 45.6089***
(117.67) (73.79) (10.62)
ceo 589.3344*** 590.1983*** 251.0295***
(115.59) (116.75) (36.52)
Male 79.8776*** 82.6025***
(8.20) (8.55)
Variance*market ret. -0.0024*** -0.0023***
(23.50) (30.45)
Variance market 76.6788*** 354.52***
(6.94) (8.19)
Constant -973.8*** -921.6*** 122.6
(63.90) (56.60) (0.24)
Time dummies yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes yes
Individual e¤ects no no yes
Observations 73370 72904 72904
Number of sectors 331 327
R-squared 0.30 0.31 0.19
Number of indiv. 18422
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
signi…cant at 10%; ** signi…cant at 5%; *** signi…cant at 1%
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Table 7: E¤ect of market returns and concentration on options granted
(1) (2) (4)
Options grant. Options grant. Options grant.
Market return 0.0000 0.0023*** 0.0015***
(1.29) (6.73) (4.31)
Market ret. squd. 2.3e-11*** 2.6e-11*** 1.9e-11***
(15.11) (17.35) (10.00)
CR4*market ret. 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0003***
(0.13) (0.66) (2.92)
ln assets 287.1187*** 133.8204*** 355.3578***
(55.90) (17.94) (16.74)
ceo 761.3032*** 765.2617*** 335.3355***
(45.61) (46.54) (10.80)
Male 85.0443** 93.0642***
(2.40) (2.67)
Variance*market ret. -0.0023*** -0.0014***
(6.64) (3.80)
Variance market 1,020.4509*** 483.3271**
(26.91) (2.32)
Constant -1,039.07*** -1,385.13*** -1,938.96
(20.18) (24.18) (0.77)
Time dummies yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes yes
Individual e¤ects no no yes
Observations 63872 63408 63408
Number of sectors 331 327
R-squared 0.11 0.13 0.07
Number of indiv. 18388
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
signi…cant at 10%; ** signi…cant at 5%; *** signi…cant at 1%
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Table 8: Deregulation of the banking sector 1994, market returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total comp. Salary+bon. Options gr.. Total comp. Salary+bon. Options gr.
Market return 0.0061*** 0.0018*** -0.0018*** 0.0070*** 0.0020*** -0.0003
(10.99) (10.52) (3.76) (11.77) (16.07) (0.47)
Market ret. squd. -4.4e-11** -1.9e-11*** -5.6e-11*** 5.2e-11*** 2.3e-12 -1.2e-11
(2.37) (3.59) (3.65) (2.96) (0.62) (0.71)
…n94 -561.92*** -164.92*** -220.08** -504.36*** -94.70*** -163.60
(4.19) (4.00) (2.04) (4.50) (4.01) (1.57)
…n94Xmktret 0.0022*** 0.0011*** 0.0004*** 0.0022*** 0.0007*** -0.0000
(11.86) (19.79) (2.73) (10.29) (14.93) (0.16)
Variance*mk. ret. -0.0052*** -0.0016*** 0.0022*** -0.0065*** -0.002*** 0.0005
(8.84) (9.13) (4.55) (10.45) (14.97) (0.74)
Variance market 783.29*** 113.88*** 686.30*** 533.57** 488.65*** 219.87
(21.35) (10.09) (22.64) (2.32) (10.12) (0.92)
ln assets 162.41*** 122.58*** 24.28*** 350.98*** 34.67*** 29.93
(22.61) (55.48) (4.06) (12.04) (5.65) (1.02)
ceo 1,174.55*** 553.19*** 536.59*** 137.13*** 180.97*** 109.17***
(59.38) (90.93) (34.82) (3.51) (22.05) (3.13)
Male 136.73*** 72.53*** 8.44
(3.23) (5.57) (0.22)
Constant -127,635*** -63,847*** -153,660*** -143,329 -44,782 -6,714
(8.87) (14.42) (12.85) (0.83) (1.23) (0.02)
Observations 39484 39484 33844 39484 39484 33844
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sector trend yes yes yes yes yes yes
Indiv. e¤ectc. no no no yes yes yes
Number of sic2 61 61 61 61 61 61
R-squared 0.21 0.34 0.09 0.09 0.15 0.03
Number of indiv. 14161 14161 12975 14161 14161 12975
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* signi…cant at 10%; ** signi…cant at 5%; *** signi…cant at 1%..
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Table 9: Deregulation of the banking sector 1994, accounting pro…ts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total comp. Sal+bonus Options gr. Total comp. Sal+bonus Options gr.
Acc. pro…ts 1.3980*** 0.4828*** -0.3659*** 3.8495*** 1.6770*** 0.8158***
(8.92) (10.55) (2.89) (12.20) (27.16) (2.76)
Acc. pro…ts squd. 1.1e-6 -3.5e-6*** 1.3e-7 0.00002*** 4.7e-6*** 2.6e-6
(0.56) (6.28) (0.08) (7.49) (8.19) (0.84)
…n94 -212.49* -107.50*** -196.20** -247.13*** -67.32*** -166.19**
(1.95) (3.38) (2.29) (2.60) (3.62) (2.02)
…n94Xpre 0.4960*** 0.2293*** 0.1024*** 0.4773*** 0.1209*** 0.0514
(11.43) (18.10) (3.05) (9.78) (12.66) (1.24)
Variance prof. 722.66*** 116.23*** 528.60*** 232.07 290.75*** 259.84
(19.50) (10.74) (17.28) (1.14) (7.33) (1.36)
Var. prof*acc. prof -1.1117*** -0.3753*** 0.4404*** -3.6427*** -1.5984*** -0.7951***
(6.95) (8.03) (3.39) (11.30) (25.34) (2.62)
ln assets 117.4362*** 90.8302*** 33.8528*** 213.9012*** 4.0159 28.3626
(15.54) (41.16) (5.33) (10.36) (0.99) (1.44)
ceo 1,180.88*** 543.83*** 534.34*** 73.38** 150.00*** 139.65***
(62.02) (97.78) (36.95) (2.48) (25.92) (5.45)
Male 124.53*** 73.37*** -14.39
(3.26) (6.57) (0.43)
Constant -25,306** -36,689*** -109,613*** -115,975 -34,735 -39,312
(2.31) (11.49) (11.68) (0.86) (1.32) (0.21)
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sector trend yes yes yes yes yes yes
Individual e¤ects no no no yes yes yes
Observations 50977 50977 41777 50977 50977 41777
Number of sect. 62 62 62 62 62 62
R-squared 0.18 0.33 0.08 0.07 0.20 0.04
Number of indiv. 15436 15436 13952 15436 15436 13952
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* signi…cant at 10%; ** signi…cant at 5%; *** signi…cant at 1%..
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Table 10: Deregulation of the banking sector 1994, robustness checks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fin. and services sec. ln Tot.Comp. Rents Stayers
Market return 0.0071*** 4.64e-6*** 0.0070*** 0.0069***
(4.42) (20.02) (11.68) (11.55)
Market ret. squd. 1.5e-10** 5.7e-15 4.4e-11** 5.1e-11***
(2.57) (0.72) (2.39) (2.89)
…n94 -505.3621*** -0.1083** -508.0139*** -530.6380***
(3.50) (2.15) (4.52) (4.74)
…n94Xmktret 0.0018*** 1.95e-7** 0.0022*** 0.0022***
(6.50) (2.54) (10.21) (10.20)
Variance*market ret. -0.0064*** -0.0000*** -0.0065*** -0.0064***
(3.72) (18.80) (10.41) (10.19)
Variance market 643.4061 0.1743* 510.5187**
(1.31) (1.68) (2.22)
ln assets 637.31*** 0.2093*** 349.27*** 374.37***
(9.51) (15.94) (11.92) (11.66)
ceo 287.72*** 0.1293*** 136.31*** 124.44***
(3.08) (7.37) (3.48) (3.13)
Rents -0.0580
(0.02)
Rents*market ret. 0.0004
(1.37)
Constant -340,736*** -251*** -144,791 -329,757***
(3.88) (3.23) (0.84) (24.57)
Time dummies yes yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes
Sector trend yes yes yes yes
Individual e¤ects yes yes yes yes
Observations 9247 39445 39418 39484
Number of indiv 3474 14147 14154
R-squared 0.15 0.17 0.09 0.08
Number of stayers 14449
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* signi…cant at 10%; ** signi…cant at 5%; *** signi…cant at 1%..
Notes: The refere nce est im ation is co lum n 4 o f Table 8 : (1 ) is c om pute d on service indu strie s (SIC 60 to 81) (2) has ln(tot .c om p.)
as dep . var iable (3) includ es re nts in the sp eci… cat ion (4) is com p uted on workers w ithin the sam e … rm
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Table 11: Deregulation of the …nancial sector 1999, market returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total comp. Sal+bonus Options gr. Total comp. Sal+bonus Options gr.
Market return 0.0137*** 0.0025*** 0.0029*** 0.0103*** 0.0018*** 0.0007
(25.91) (19.93) (6.59) (19.39) (20.10) (1.53)
Market ret. sq. 1.9e-11*** 1.0e-12** 1.9e-11*** 1.1e-11*** 2.2e-12*** 1.5e-11***
(9.63) (2.22) (11.72) (5.31) (6.03) (7.24)
…n -793.2*** -175.5*** -326.2*** -635.4*** -147.8*** -237.5**
(5.87) (5.55) (2.93) (5.42) (7.57) (2.32)
…nXmktret 0.0015*** 0.0002*** 0.0002** 0.0016*** 0.0002*** 0.0003***
(12.76) (8.35) (2.06) (14.11) (10.39) (2.83)
Var.*mark. ret. -0.0136*** -0.0024*** -0.0029*** -0.0104*** -0.0018*** -0.0007
(25.28) (19.30) (6.42) (19.28) (19.75) (1.43)
Variance mark. 1,622.8*** 44.8*** 1,873.5*** -578.6 744.8*** -960.6**
(25.22) (2.98) (34.51) (1.05) (8.13) (2.02)
ln assets 342.9069*** 195.0105*** 110.8193*** 1,100.0066*** 74.4715*** 584.2***
(27.08) (65.79) (10.33) (24.98) (10.15) (14.62)
ceo 1,529.1*** 631.8*** 980.5*** 194.4*** 268.3*** 316.4***
(48.07) (84.86) (38.41) (2.89) (23.94) (5.65)
Male 259.6527*** 73.3866*** 25.8249
(4.69) (5.67) (0.53)
Constant -497,822*** -110,447*** -321,563*** -62,499 -45,489 -176,154
(19.54) (18.52) (15.28) (0.07) (0.32) (0.29)
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sector trend yes yes yes yes yes yes
Individual e¤. no no no yes yes yes
Observations 41486 41486 36662 41486 41486 36662
Number of sic2 62 62 62 62 62 62
R-squared 0.21 0.33 0.16 0.11 0.17 0.06
Number of indiv. 14943 14943 14898 14943 14943 14898
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* signi…cant at 10%; ** signi…cant at 5%; *** signi…cant at 1%
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Table 12: Deregulation of the …nancial sector 1999, accounting pro…ts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total comp. Sal+bonus Options gr. Total comp. Sal+bonus Options gr.
Acc. pro…ts 1.1834*** 0.4525*** -0.9696*** 5.4825*** 1.367*** 1.0060**
(5.67) (9.36) (5.38) (12.48) (18.99) (2.45)
Acc. pro…ts sq. -0.00001*** -3.9e-6*** -2.3e-6* 1.3e-6 -1.6e-6*** 7.2e-6***
(6.70) (11.26) (1.66) (0.76) (5.53) (4.05)
…n -53.3 -96.9*** -212.1* -123.8 -47.21*** -164.2
(0.41) (3.19) (1.91) (1.09) (2.53) (1.63)
…nXpre 0.4277*** 0.1888*** 0.1313*** 0.4839*** 0.07*** 0.1317***
(9.97) (18.99) (3.73) (11.02) (10.17) (3.19)
Variance prof. 1,089.1*** 133.2*** 1,170.5*** -1,038.9** -473.3*** -1,671.8***
(15.88) (8.38) (19.29) (2.55) (7.09) (4.63)
Var. pr*acc.pr. -0.6677*** -0.3087*** 1.1542*** -5.3795*** -1.299** -1.0225**
(3.13) (6.24) (6.25) (11.70) (17.24) (2.37)
ln assets 263.0*** 131.8*** 172.2*** 906.3*** 34.51*** 598.6***
(17.37) (37.54) (12.72) (24.56) (5.7) (16.89)
ceo 1,519.7*** 627.1*** 991.0*** 197.1*** 252.5*** 390.5***
(48.61) (86.50) (38.33) (3.15) (24.63) (7.28)
Male 253.1560*** 75.8750*** 10.3479
(4.77) (6.17) (0.21)
Constant -373,684*** -73,268*** -341,964*** -423,541 -195,686 45,479
(15.27) (12.91) (16.40) (0.50) (1.40) (0.04)
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sector trend yes yes yes yes yes yes
Individual e¤. no no no yes yes yes
Observations 44167 44167 38746 44167 38746 38746
Number of sic2 62 62 62 62 62 62
R-squared 0.20 0.34 0.14 0.11 0.17 0.06
Number of ind. 15480 15432 15432 15480 15480 15432
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* signi…cant at 10%; ** signi…cant at 5%; *** signi…cant at 1%
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Table 13: Deregulation of the …nancial sector 1999, robustness checks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fin. and services sec. ln Tot.Comp. Rents Stayers
Market return 0.0117*** 4.64e-6*** 0.0102*** 0.0105***
(10.64) (27.28) (19.09) (19.77)
Market ret. squd. 2.7e-11*** 3.7e-16 1.2e-11*** 1.1e-11***
(8.10) (0.53) (5.53) (5.12)
…n -674.0828*** -0.2743*** -638.7240*** -616.1032***
(4.05) (7.31) (5.42) (5.28)
…nXmktret 0.0017*** 1.95e-7*** 0.0016*** 0.0016***
(13.42) (5.27) (14.07) (14.07)
Variance*market ret. -0.0120*** -0.0000*** -0.0103*** -0.0106***
(10.84) (26.90) (18.91) (19.66)
Variance market 704.8854 -0.2098 -581.6126
(0.49) (1.15) (1.06)
ln assets 1,027.3077*** 0.4299*** 1,114.5571*** 1,216.1255***
(12.50) (30.41) (24.91) (25.88)
ceo 139.5992 0.1673*** 194.4852*** 130.9413*
(1.01) (7.74) (2.88) (1.90)
Rents 11.0591**
(2.11)
Rents*market ret. -0.0001
(1.53)
Constant -2,093,703.1*** -99.0 -65,368.8 -724,942.3***
(8.90) (0.36) (0.08) (30.08)
Time dummies yes yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes
Sector trend yes yes yes yes
Individual e¤ects yes yes yes yes
Observations 11092 41403 41425 41486
Number of individuals 4127 14925 14933
R-squared 0.13 0.19 0.11 0.11
Number of stayers 15280
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* signi…cant at 10%; ** signi…cant at 5%; *** signi…cant at 1%..
Notes: The refe renc e e stim ation is c olu m n 4 of Table 11: (1 ) is c om pute d on service ind ustrie s (SIC 60 to 81) (2) has ln(tot .c om p.)
as dep .var iable (3) in clud es re nts in the sp eci… cat ion (4) is com p uted on workers w ithin th e sam e … rm
34
CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Recent Discussion Papers  
 
616 James Harrigan 
Anthony J. Venables 
Timelines, Trade and Agglomeration 
   
615 Howard Gospel 
Paul Willman 
Comparatively Open:  Statutory Information 
Disclosure for Consultation and Bargaining in 
Germany, France and the UK 
   
614 Andrew B. Bernard 
Stephen Redding 
Peter K. Schott 
Helen Simpson 
Relative Wage Variation and Industry Location 
   
613 David Marsden Unions and Procedural Justice:  An Alternative to the 
Common Rule 
   
612 David G. Blanchflower 
Alex Bryson 
The Union Wage Premium in the US and the UK 
   
611 Stephen Gibbons 
Stephen Machin 
Valuing Rail Access Using Transport Innovation 
   
610 Johannes Hörner 
L.Rachel Ngai 
Claudia Olivetti 
Public Enterprises and Labor Market Performance 
   
609 Nikolaus Wolf Endowments, Market Potential, and Industrial 
Location:  Evidence from Interwar Poland 
(1918-1939) 
   
608 Ellen E. Meade 
David Stasavage 
Publicity of Debate and the Incentive to Dissent:  
Evidence from the US Federal Reserve 
   
607 Ghazala Azmat 
Maia Güell 
Alan Manning 
Gender Gaps in Unemployment Rates in OECD 
Countries 
   
606 Henry G. Overman 
L. Alan Winters 
The Geography of UK International Trade 
   
605 Stephen Machin 
Stephen Wood 
Looking for HRM/Union Substitution:  Evidence 
from British Workplaces 
   
604 Maarten Goos 
Alan Manning 
Lousy and Lovely Jobs:  the Rising Polarization of 
Work in Britain 
   
603 Nan-Kuang Chen 
Hsiao-Lei Chu 
Collateral Value and Forbearance Lending 
   
602 Ricardo Peccei 
Helen Bewley 
Howard Gospel 
Paul Willman 
Is it Good To Talk?  Information Disclosure and 
Organisational Performance in the UK 
Incorporating evidence submitted on the DTI 
discussion paper ‘High Performance Workplaces – 
Informing and Consulting Employees’ 
   
601 Andy Charlwood The Anatomy of Union Decline in Britain 
1990-1998 
   
600 Christopher A. Pissarides Unemployment in Britain:  A European Success Story 
   
599 Stephen Bond 
Dietmar Harhoff 
John Van Reenen 
Corporate R&D and Productivity in Germany and the 
United Kingdom 
   
598 Michael Storper 
Anthony J. Venables 
Buzz:  Face-to-Face Contact and the Urban Economy 
   
597 Stephen Gibbons 
Alan Manning 
The Incidence of UK Housing Benefit:  Evidence 
from the 1990s Reforms 
   
596 Paul Gregg 
Maria Gutiérrez-
Domènech 
Jane Waldfogel 
The Employment of Married Mothers in Great 
Britain:  1974-2000 
   
595 Stephen Bond 
Dietmar Harhoff 
John Van Reenen 
Investment, R&D and Financial Constraints in Britain 
and Germany 
   
594 Andrew B. Bernard 
Stephen Redding 
Peter K. Schott 
Product Choice and Product Switching 
   
 
 
The Centre for Economic Performance Publications Unit 
Tel  020 7955 7673     Fax  020 7955 7595     Email  info@cep.lse.ac.uk 
Web site  http://cep.lse.ac.uk 
